In this paper, we propose BAN-GZKP that optimizes the best to date secure lightweight and energy efficient authentication scheme, BANZKP, designed for WBAN networks. BANZKP is vulnerable to several security attacks such as the replay attack, DDoS attacks at sink and redundancy information crack. Also BANZKP needs an end-to-end authentication which is not compliant with the human body postural mobility. Our scheme, BAN-GZKP, improves both the security and postural mobility resilience of BANZKP. In order to fix the security vulnerabilities of BANZKP, BAN-GZKP uses a novel random key allocation. Moreover, BAN-GZKP uses a hop-by-hop authentication scheme which makes it tolerant to postural mobility. We further prove the reliability of our scheme to various attacks including those to which BANZKP is vulnerable. Furthermore, via extensive simulations we prove that our scheme, BAN-GZKP, outperforms BANZKP in terms of reliability to human body postural mobility for various network parameters (end-to-end delay, number of packets exchanged in the network, number of transmissions). We compared both schemes using representative convergecast strategies with various transmission rates and human postural mobility. When our BAN-GZKP scheme is used the percentage of packets received increases by 34.06%, the end-to-end-delay reduces by 36.02% and the number of transmissions reduces by 8.75% with respect to the case when BANZKP is used. Moreover, BAN-GZKP uses only a three-phase authentication which is optimal in the class of ZKP protocols. Finally, it is important to mention that BAN-GZKP has no additional cost in terms memory, computational complexity or energy consumption compared to BANZKP.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Body Area Networks (WBAN) is a special kind of Wireless Sensors Networks (WSN). In WBAN, networked body sensors collect user's physiological data and transmit them to a sink node. There is a tremendous difference between WBAN and classical WSN. In WBAN nodes are distributed on/in human body and, similar to the DTNs, move with the human postural mobility. Because of that, the network topology in Intra-WBAN dynamically changes following the postural body mobility. In a recent work related to channel modes for WBAN [1] the authors advocate for the use of multi-hops communication in WBAN.
Multi-hop WBAN communication schemes easily adapt to postural mobility where nodes and links are highly dynamic. Also, multi-hop communications need lower transmission power compared to one-hop direct communication where source nodes have to use enough transmission power in order to make sure that their messages can reach the sink directly. Moreover, lower transmission powers automatically reduce the radio radiation of the human body, which became an important issue today.
However, multi-hop communication in WBAN is vulnerable to security and privacy attacks. Any medical data error, leakage or imitation may lead to a wrong medical treatment.
The disclosure of critical health information can also have irreversible consequences on the patients daily life. Security mechanisms are thus needed in WBAN to protect user's data from malicious eavesdropping, tampering or abuse.
Recently, the literature investigated Inter-WBANs security. As an example, [2] and [3] discuss the security mechanism for communications from the sink to the remote Health Centre (hospitals or online doctors). In this context the security of the Intra-WBAN communication should also be carefully considered: date leakage or tampering of source nodes from Intra-WBAN area leads to a meaningless subsequent Inter-WBAN security protection.
The challenges of Intra-WBAN security are threefold: firstly, the computing capacity of WBAN devices is limited. Traditional encryption and decryption algorithms used for personal computers or mobile phone may be not applicable as they are to the WBAN devices. Secondly, poor storage of WBAN devices may not be able to store too much shared content to make effective the recent complex authentication and security protocols. Thirdly, control message exchanges may lead to poor applicative performances.
The most basic encryption mechanism, symmetric encryption, uses the same secret key to encrypt and decrypt data. As symmetric key can be directly used in Stream cipher or Block cipher, the coding speed and its efficiency are very competitive. However, in symmetric encryption, by using the all-networks-widely fixed key, if one node has been compromised, the secret key will be known by adversary who can then monitor the entire networks. Also, symmetric encryption suffers from replay attack due to the use of the same encryption key. Some improvement solutions come out in recent years: MiniSec [4] for example. Without using the same key, MiniSec uses data sequence as a part of encryption key. However, MiniSec needs to synchronize sequences of packets when the number of missing messages is important. This is often the case in a WBAN environment. Also MiniSec suffers from DDoS attack at the sink.
Public key infrastructure (PKI) is a widely-used asymmetric encryption, authentication and access control mechanism [5] . Especially after the introduction of elliptic curve encryption (ECC) mechanism [6] which is proved more efficient than traditional PKI. However, this kind of mechanism needs an additional Certification Authority (CA) to generate user certification and even some ID-based [7] or certificateless based [8] mechanisms need also the Networks Manager (NM) to achieve this security function, which are not well suitable for Intra-WBAN communication. Complex parameter assignment and key management are also the major challenges for asymmetric encryption in WBAN.
Another trend is the security scheme based on the physiological signal or channel quality have be introduced in [9] and [10] . In this way nodes can use the collected physiological signals to encrypt and decrypt messages. However, the processing of these physiological signals needs additional powerful elements. These elements are expensive and consume additional energy. Also, the distance, the changing of temperature or the human body during the mobility can make the collected physiological signals different at two different nodes.
More recently, in order to respond to the three challenges of WBAN security, BANZKP [11] and TinyZKP [12] where specifically designed for WBAN and use Zero Knowledge Proof based authentication mechanism.
The best to date ZKP-based scheme, BANZKP [11] , uses less memory to store private secrets and requires less computing capacity than TinyZKP [12] and the Elliptic Curve Encryption Based Public Key Authentication scheme [6] . BANZKP is also resilient to a wide range of attacks. However, BANZKP still suffers from some specific malicious attacks such as Data Replay attack, DDoS Attack at sink and Redundancy Information Crack. Moreover, the resilience of BANZKP to human body postural mobility in WBAN environment is still an open question. a) Our contribution: In this paper, based on an extensive analyze of the security weakness of BANZKP we propose a new ZKP-based scheme that preserves the properties of BANZKP. Our scheme BAN-GZKP is resilient to Data Redundancy Cracking, Data Replay Attack and DDoS Attack at the sink. Furthermore, we stress both BAN-GZKP and BANZKP schemes face to human body postural mobility. When these schemes are plugged to convergecast protocols we prove via extensive simulations that for strategies that use BAN-GZKP scheme the percentage of packets received increases by 34.06%, the end-to-end-delay reduces by 36.02% and the number of transmissions reduces by 8.75% with respect to the case when BANZKP is used. Additionally, our BAN-GZKP scheme presents better computational complexity and less energy consumption than BANZKP while it has the same memory complexity.
b) Paper Roadmap: The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents and overview of the BANZKP scheme and discusses its vulnerabilities. Then, Section II-C presents the analysis of the resilience of BANZKP face to human body postural mobility when BANZKP is combined with known convergecast strategies. Section III presents our new BAN-GZKP, its security analysis and its performances compared to BANZKP scheme.
II. BANZKP VS SECURITY ATTACKS AND POSTURAL MOBILITY
In this section we recall briefly BANZKP [11] (the best to date ZKP-based scheme designed for WBAN), then we analyze its vulnerabilities in terms of resilience to security attacks and human postural mobility.
A. BANZKP Overview
BANZKP [11] combines a Zero knowledge Proof and a Commitment Scheme. The Zero knowledge Proof scheme ensures bidirectional authentication between two parties (a sender and a verifier). The security level is guaranteed by the fact that it is practically impossible to solve the discrete logarithms for numbers represented on hundreds of bits. In BANZKP the two parties exchange five challenge/response messages and never disclose the shared secret.
The Commitment Scheme ensures that a sender transmits an encrypted message to a receiver which does not have the decryption key yet. The key is transmitted later as soon as the identity of the receiver is confirmed. BANZKP between two nodes N 1 and N 2 executes the following five steps:
where ID N1 and ID N2 are identities of N 1 and N 2 respectively; V is the shared secret number (a big number); p and q are two random values generated by N 1 and N 2 , respectively; K I is a shared key between N 1 and N 2 ; K CS is a random key generated by N 2 for the Commitment Scheme and the function E(K[a]) means encrypt a with key K. RI is the indicator of the beginning of an interval value of V q * p , represented by V q * p RI . In BANZKP, the size of this interval is 200 bits. During the initialization phase, both participant nodes store locally a shared secret number V and a shared key K I .
During the authentication phase, when a source node has Data packet to send, an authentication session is initiated: 1) N 1 initiates the authentication session. It choses a random value p and computes V p . It then encrypts his ID and V p by K I and sends the whole message to N 2 . 2) Upon reception of V p , N 2 generates a random value q and computes V q and V p * q . N 2 then generates a random indicator RI and choses a 200 bits interval value of the V p * q from the indicator RI, as V p * q RI (see Figure 1 ). N 2 sends back to N 1 : (1) ID N2 , V q and RI encrypted by K I ; (2) V p * q RI encrypted by a random chosen session key K CS . 3) Upon reception of response of N 2 , N 1 computes V q * p and uses the received RI to compute V q * p RI . N 1 then sends his ID and V q * p RI encrypted by K I to N 2 . N 1 also keeps E(K CS [V p * q RI ]) from N 2 and waits the K CS sent later to verify the legitimacy of N 2 . 4) Upon reception of V q * p RI , N 2 compares this value with his own value, V p * q RI . If these two values are equal, then N 2 is sure that N 1 has the same shared secret V . Then it confirms the authentication by sending the K CS to N 1 . Otherwise, N 2 discards the message and closes the session.
) and compares this value with its own value, V q * p RI . If these two values are equal, N 1 is sure that N 2 has the same secret V , and sends ID and DAT A encrypted by K I to N 2 . Otherwise, N 1 discards the message and closes the session. BANZKP copes with the following attacks: a) Forge Nodes: Thanks to the bidirectional authentication, any forge node attempting to disguise itself in a legitimate node cannot be certified. This is due to the fact that forge node has no information on the shared secret. Hence, it cannot compute the correct authentication response. b) Replay Attack: Adversary could intercept previous exchanged messages and try to use them to make other nodes in the networks trust its identity and finish the bidirectional authentication. The use of randomly chosen p and q makes each authentication session different with respect to the previous ones. Hence, old messages cannot help to correctly execute the authentication. c) Man in the Middle Attack: In this attack, the adversary listens channels and try to steal the shared secret. BANZKP does not send directly secret information.
d) Guessing Attack: The use of random values for q, p and RI makes practically impossible for the adversary to guess the shared secret value V from V q * p RI or V p * q RI . e) Privacy Attack: The adversary may try to eavesdrop. BANZKP prevents this attack by encrypting exchanged DATA with K I .
B. BANZKP vulnerabilities
In this section we analyze the BANZKP vulnerabilities. a) Data Replay Attack: BANZKP scheme can prevent malicious authentication message replay by using the random values q, p and RI. However, for encrypting Data message, a constant key K I is used for all Data message. A conscious adversary may launch a Data Replay Attack by observing the pattern of the exchanges. For example, two nodes are exchanging the authentication messages; an adversary, who holds a captured previous Data message encrypted by K I from N 1 in previous authentication session between N 1 and Fig. 1 . Computing V p * q RI N 2 , is listening the channel. In the phase 4) of BANZKP, N 2 sends the random key, K CS to N 1 . The adversary can also receive this key. At this particular moment, the adversary knows that N 2 is, from now on, waiting for an encrypted Data. The adversary thus sends immediately the previous captured Data message to N 2 to pretend this expired Data message as a fresh one. The consequence is that N 2 treats the expired Data message as the right one and ignores the right message from N 1 and allows the adversary to inject invalid Data into the networks.
b) Redundancy Information Crack: The encryption in BANZKP uses the stream cipher mechanism where each bit of collected Data does the exclusive or with each bit of the encryption key. Since the key used for Data encryption is always the same K I at the end of each authentication session, Data messages sent by source nodes have the following format:
. By capturing M 1 and M 2 , the adversary can do the exclusive or of them to get redundancy information: M 1 xor M 2 = Data 1 xor Data 2 . After getting enough redundancy information, encrypted Data could be cracked and from the creaked Data, K I then will be no longer a secret. c) DDoS Attack at Sink: BANZKP was designed to work for both single-hop and multi-hop WBAN networks. In multi-hop WBAN environment, BANZKP uses relay nodes to forward the source messages to the sink. From the original BANZKP design, the bidirectional authentication is an endto-end authentication between the source node and the sink. Relay nodes will just forward the messages. Hence all the authentication or Data information is transparent to them. If an adversary sends continuous invalid authentication request messages (phase 1) of the BANZKP scheme, relay nodes will forward these messages to the sink. The sink will then suffer from a DDoS attack if the amount of the authentication requests is high. The network resources will be consumed by these invalid authentication requests and the real authentication messages get thus less chance to reach the sink.
C. Analysis of BANZKP Resilience to Postural Mobility
In the following we analyze the effectiveness of BANZKP scheme face to postural mobility. We therefore consider as case study the convergecast problem where DATA messages sent by source nodes are collected by a specific node in the network called sink. We enrich representative convergecast strategies specifically designed for multi-hop WBAN with BANZKP scheme. Note that the original BANZKP scheme requires an end-to-end authentication where all the authentication messages are transparent to relay nodes. Only the source and the sink can understand these messages.
Since the end-to-end authentication may be difficult to achieve in a multi-hop WBAN with postural mobility we also evaluate the effectiveness of BANZKP adapted to hop-by-hop authentication. That is, source nodes initiate authentication with their one hop neighbours. If these nodes are chosen to relay DATA messages then before relaying these messages they apply the hop-by-hop authentication with their neighbors.
We evaluate the performances of both BANZKP end-toend and BANZKP hop-by-hop when these schemes are used in a secure convergecast process. Our evaluation focuses the percentage of packets received at sink for various rates of transmissions and various postural mobilities.
In the next section we briefly present the convergecast strategies we evaluate and the way we plugged the BANZKP scheme (end-to-end and hop-by-hop) to these strategies. Then we discuss our simulation results.
1) Convergecast Strategies: In [13] and [14] , authors classify existing convergecast strategies for WBAN into five classes: Multi-Paths based Strategies, Tree-based Strategy, Dynamic Path Strategies, Gossip-based Strategies and Attenuation-based Strategies. In our study we plug the BANZKP scheme on five different convergecast strategies (one representative per class). a) Multi-Paths based Strategies: are based on predetermined paths and use these overlay paths as a reliability mechanism. An example is APAP [13] . In APAP, each source node sends a message to maximum two pre-determined parents. Each parent then forwards received messages to maximum two of their parents. b) Tree-based Strategy: [14] pre-constructs seven Best-Path Trees for different human postures shown in Figures 2 to 8. Source nodes send messages through these paths to the sink. The pre-constructed Best-Path Trees are computed according to random attenuation distribution of each links. c) Dynamic Path Strategies: construct and update a treebased overlay. Strategy CTP [15] is an example of this class. In CTP each node sends additional BEACON messages to update the overlay route from each source to the sink. d) Gossip-based Strategies: use flooding. In this class we choose FloodToSink [13] , where a source diffuses messages to all its neighbours, neighbours then continue to forward messages to all their neighbours and so on. In this case, every packet has a parameter, TTL, to limit the number of forwardings.
e) Attenuation-based Strategies: these strategies are based on the negotiation of the channel attenuation. When a source has packets to send, it broadcasts firstly a Request (REQ) to ask an estimate attenuation from the receiver of this Request to the sink. The receiver of this Request will then send back a Reply (REP) with the required estimate attenuation value. The source receiving Replies will chose the next hop among replying nodes and sends data packets to it. In this class we investigate strategy MiniAtt [13] . This strategy choses one node who has the minimal estimate attenuation to the sink; if no Reply has been received for a while, the source will re-send the Request.
In our simulations we use five strategies to represent each class of convergecast strategies: APAP for Multi-Paths based Strategies; FloodToSink for Gossip-based Strategies; Mini-Att for Attenuation-based Strategies; CTP for Dynamic Path Strategies and Tree-based Strategy to represent itself.
2) How BANZKP pluggs to convergecast strategies: We explain below how BANZKP scheme can be plugged to the WBAN convergecast scheme. The general idea is that before each source node sends any Data packet, it needs to do the authentication with the sink in the BANZKP end-to-end scheme or with the next hop in the BANZKP hop-by-hop scheme.
a) Convergecast with BANZKP end-to-end: In the authentication phase of BANZKP end-to-end scheme, source nodes need to exchange an authentication message with the sink. However as original convergecase strategies care about only how to flow authentication messages and DATA messages from source to the sink (up stream), we need to define how messages from the sink can be flowed down to the source (down stream). In APAP, CTP and Tree-based strategies, messages generated by the sink will follow the opposite route with respect to the up stream exchanges. That is, parents forward messages to their sons until messages reach the sources.
For MiniAtt strategy, for both up stream and down stream, nodes always need from their neighbors attenuation information in order to chose the next hop. The difference is that for up stream, nodes ask the attenuation between the receiver and the sink; for down stream, nodes ask the attenuation information between the receiver and the initial source.
For FloodToSink there is no difference between the up stream and the down stream. b) Convergecast with BANZKP hop-by-hop: In this case, there is only up stream for DATA from the source to the sink, since nodes only authenticate with their one hop neighbours. After the authentication, nodes send DATA messages to the authenticated neighbour. So there is no authentication flow during the transmission, only the DATA message will be forwarded from the source to the sink as up stream.
Note that, for APAP and FloodToSink, there is always a multi-receiver when a source initiates the authentication. Receivers will reply to the source, the source then continue the authentication exchanging with all of them. But only the neighbour who finished the authentication phase firstly can be chosen as the legal next hop to avoid additional DATA message and to respect the original convergecast strategy.
For MiniAtt strategy, the BANZKP hop-by-hop scheme can be integrated into the original Attenuation Require-Response scheme as follows: after a source chooses the next hop it begins to initiate the authentication directly with the chosen node. For CTP and Tree-based strategies, there is only one parent to forward messages. Hence, the authentication is initiated by nodes with their parents.
3) Channel and Human Mobility Model: The WBAN model we used in our research is proposed in [16] . They implement the realistic channel model proposed in [1] over the physical layer implementation provided by the Mixim framework [17] . This channel model of an on-body 2.45 GHz channel between 7 nodes, that belong to the same WBAN, uses small directional antennas modeled as if they were 1.5cm away from the body. Nodes are assumed to be attached to the human body on the head, chest, upper arm, wrist, navel thigh, and ankle. In the convergecast strategies we consider six source nodes to send Data as follows: 0)navel, 2)head, 3)upper arm, 4)ankle, 5)thigh and 6)wrist, and one sink node that collects Data, node 1)chest. Nodes positions are calculated in 7 postures: walking (walk), running (run), walking weakly (weak), sitting down (sit), wearing a jacket (wear), sleeping (sleep), and lying down (lie) (see Figures 2 to 8 ). Channel attenuations are calculated between each couple of nodes for each of these positions as the average attenuation (in dB) and the standard deviation (in dBm). The model takes into account: the shadowing, reflection, diffraction, and scattering by body parts. Naganawa et al. [1] studied a cooperative transmission scheme: two-hop relaying scheme. Using the simulated path loss, the performance of such scheme were evaluated by comparing the outage probability using different relay nodes against a direct link between a source and a destination. They advocate for the use of multi-hops communication, adding to this, a significant decrease of the transmission power.
4) Simulation Results:
In order to evaluate the strategies described above in a realistic WBAN scenario, we implemented them under the OMNeT++ simulator enriched with the Mixim project [17] that specifically models the lower network WBAN layers.
We use standard IEEE 802.15.4 protocol as MAC layer. Note that the most recent standard IEEE 802.15.6 proposed for WBAN considers a star network topology (one hop) and does not take into account the human body postural mobility. As stressed in the introduction we focus multi-hop networks and human body postural mobility.
We consider the following packet rates at the application layer: 1 packet/second, 5 packets/second and 10 packets/second. These values are commonly used in WBAN. The sensibility of WBAN devices is -100dBm and the transmission power has been set as -60dBm. We stress the studied strategies under a realistic channel model and postural mobility as described above.
Firstly, for all the studied convergecast strategies, the plugg of BANZKP end-to-end or hop-by-hop, induces an impor- For APAP, Tree-based and CTP strategies (see Figures 9 to  11) , the reception ratios are similar when BANZKP end-toend and BANZKP hop-by-hop schemes are used. These three strategies are based on overlay paths to forward the messages. APAP and Tree-based strategies use pre-defined paths while CTP constructs these paths in a dynamic way.
MiniAtt strategy, see Figure 12 , enriched with BANZKP hop-by-hop scheme presents better performances than Mini-Att enriched with BANZKP end-to-end scheme. This is due mainly to the easy of the adaptation of MiniAtt strategy to the BANZKP hop-by-hop scheme. Note that in the end-toend scheme, every exchanged message during the transmission has to wait the negotiation with neighbours before the transmission. Every exchanged message thus has to finish several negotiations from source node to the sink: this long trip makes the end-to-end scheme less effective with the MiniAtt strategy.
In FloodToSInk strategy, see Figure 13 , with BANZKP end-to-end scheme has the poorest performances. With the increase of the packets rate, original strategy and hop-by-hop scheme decrease gently. However, in the end-to-end scheme, the ratio of reception deceases fast and even shows a ratio of reception lower than 1%. This is due to the way packets are routed in FloodToSInk strategy: packets have no path to follow, they can be received by anyone in the transmission range. The blind forwarding is stopped only by the TTL limit. In FloodToSInk enriched with BANZKP hop-by-hop scheme, each hop-by-hop authentication phase can effectively limit packet's propagation. FloodToSInk enriched with BANZKP end-to-end scheme, every exchanged authentication message and Data message will be forwarded in the network. This leads to an important number of transmissions, collision and performance degradation. 
III. BAN-GZKP
This section is dedicated to the presentation of our new BAN-GZKP scheme that improves over BANZKP in several ways. BAN-GZKP is resilient to all the attacks supported by BANZKP plus the Data Replay Attack, Redundancy Information Crack and DDoS attack at sink. Moreover, BAN-GZKP presents better performances in terms of percentage of packets received at the sink, end-to-end delay and number of transmissions. Finally, BAN-GZKP needs only three phase exchanges which is optimal in the ZKP class of schemes.
We first present the ingredients that compose our new BAN-GZKP scheme and analyze its attack resilience, memory and computational requirements. Furthermore, we evaluate this scheme face to postural mobility.
A. BAN-GZKP Ingredients
In order to tolerate Data Replay Attack, Redundancy Information Crack and DDoS attack at sink BAN-GZKP uses two ingredients: a random key allocation and a hop-by-hop authentication.
a) Random Key Allocation: Data Replay Attack and Redundancy Information Crack are possible in BANZKP because a constant key K I is used to encrypt all DATA messages.
An effective and well adapted key management mechanism is necessary to generate different encryption keys for DATA messages per session.
The idea of Random Key Allocation is as follows: when nodes authenticate, the shared secret value V q * p will be obligatory computed for each authentication session. Since p and q are randomly chosen, V q * p is also random. During the authentication phase 4 in the original BANZKP, N 2 will send the random session key to N 1 to decrypt previous information. Notice that, even though K CS is random, this key should not be used to encrypt DATA messages because it has been sent on clear text. Our idea is to use K CS as a random pointer that will point to a bit in the binary representation of the random value V q * p . Then we chose an interval in the binary representation of V q * p that starts with the bit pointed by the random pointer K CS . This interval, of length K CS can be seen as a random key, K R , to encrypt Data message for the current session (see Figure 14 ).
Our Random Key Allocation does not require additional keys at the initialization and does not need the send of additional fields. b) Hop-by-Hop Scheme: Note that Sink-Side DDoS Attack happens in the end-to-end authentication scheme because relay nodes cannot detect whether the authentication message is legal or not. Only the sink can do. To solve this problem and prevent Sink-Side DDoS Attack, we need to provide relay nodes with the capacity to detect invalid authentications.
The idea is as follows, instead of doing the authentication between the pair source-sink, we let source nodes to initiate authentication directly with their one-hop neighbours. After this authentication phase finishes with success, a source is allowed to send DATA messages to the authenticated neighbour. The neighbour who receives DATA messages can then initiate authentication with its neighbours until DATA reaches to the sink.
An adversary who wants to initiate a large number of invalid authentication requests to block the network will be detected directly by its one-hop neighbours and the DDoS Attack can thus be limited in a local range.
B. BAN-GZKP description
BAN-GZKP uses the random key allocation described above and has an optimal number of exchange phases in the class of ZKP schemes. The idea of the optimization proposed by BAN-GZKP is as follows. When a source node N 1 initiates authentication with another node N 2 that previously authenticated with N 1 and that recognizes the identity of N 1 , then N 2 instead of sending back
is encrypted with K CS (as in original BANZKP scheme), it sends back directly V p * q RI encrypted with the initial key K I . In our BAN-GZKP N 2 needs just to send a random pointer R for the Random Key Allocation. Hence, the final message sent back to N 1 is: E(K I [ID N2 ||V q ||RI||R||V p * q RI ]). After receiving the response of N 2 , N 1 finishes the authentication using the same mechanism, and choses a random key, K R , from the pointer R of Random Key Allocation and encrypt Data by K R then sends the message to N 2 . We thus can complete the authentication session after the first successful authentication between these two nodes. The scheme is as follows (we preserve the same notations as for the description of the BANZKP scheme):
C. BAN-GZKP Security Analysis
Even though BAN-GZKP reduces the number of authentication messages it tolerates the attacks tolerated by BANZKP For Forge Nodes Attack, the sender node will always do the authentication with the receiver node; the receiver node does also the authentication with sender node only the first time. Thus, even though the adversary disguises itself in a legal node who previously finished the authentication with the receiver, DATA message sent by this adversary cannot be decrypted correctly. This is true because the adversary cannot generate correct K R .
For Replay Attack, if the adversary replays the message sent by N 1 in the exchange number 1), even though N 2 trusts it, DATA message encrypted with the wrong encryption key will be detected by N 2 at the end of the authentication phase. If the adversary tries to replay the message sent by N 2 in phase number 2), this message will directly fail since q and p are different random values for each session.
Notice that, we cannot simplify the authentication at N 1 . Otherwise, the adversary can replay the same message from N 2 , to force N 1 to use the same key K R to encrypt the Data message. Hence, the adversary can later initiate a Redundancy Information Crack.
Man in the Middle Attack and Guessing Attack can also be prevented because the new optimization scheme does not send any additional information related to the secret V .
D. Simulation Results
In this section we evaluate the performances of BAN-GZKP end-to-end and hop-by-hop scheme in the exactly the same conditions and with the same parameters as we used for the evaluation of BANZKP scheme.
Due to the pages limit, we provide results only for posture walking. Figures 15 to 17 show the comparison performances of the original strategies enriched with BANZKP and BAN-GZKP schemes. We measure the ratio of reception, the endto-end delay and the number of the transmissions at 10 packets/second.
In terms of reception ratio (Figure 15 ), BAN-GZKP clearly presents an improvement. This is due to the fact that BAN- For the end-to-end delay (Figure 16 ), the tree based overlay strategies, where the original strategy has the lowest delay, the BAN-GZKP improves over the BANZKP in both end-to-end and hop-by-hop scheme. However, the delay is greater than the delay of the original strategy. This is due to the fact that more control messages exchange will lead to more collisions and BackOffs which will lead to the important end-to-end delay. Interestingly, in MiniAtt and FloodToSink strategies, original strategies present an important delay. However the low ratio of reception when using BANZKP-like schemes in these two strategies lead to the conclusion that only the source nodes near the sink will have enough chance to finish authentication with the sink. The percentage of received packets who are close to the sink is much more important than of those far away from sink.
The number of the transmissions (Figure 17 ) in BAN-GZKP, can also be reduced to ensure the networks performance and energy saving. In strategies APAP, tree-based and CTP, the number of the transmissions has the same shape as the End-To-End Delay. For the same reason, original MiniAtt has higher number of transmissions. FloodToSink presents an important number of transmissions due to the fact that messages are forwarded in the network until TTL.
To resume the simulation results we can conclude that: the reception percentage is increased (with respect to the case when BANZKP is used) by 33.35% in average when BAN-GZKP end-to-end is used and by 34.06% when BAN-GZKP hop-by-hop is used. The end-to-end-delay reduces with 32.48% in average among all the strategies with BAN-GZKP end-to-end authentication and with 36.02% whit BAN-GZKP hop-by-hop authentication. The number of transmissions reduces with 8.75% in average for all the strategies that use BAN-GZKP end-to-end authentication and with 14.11% with BAN-GZKP hop-by-hop.
E. Memory and Computational Complexity and Energy Consumption
In [11] , authors prove that BANZKP improves over existing similar schemes in terms of memory requirements, computation complexity and energy consumption. In the following we study the costs of BAN-GZKP compared to BANZKP. In terms of the parameters required to be stored by each node for the initial phase, both the end-to-end and hop-by-hop BAN-GZKP need that source nodes and the sink store the shared value V and the initial key K I . Hence, BAN-GZKP has the same memory complexity as the original BANZKP.
In terms of computational complexity, a complete authentication phase in the original BANZKP requires four times big number multiplications and five times encryption/decryption. Our BAN-GZKP scheme requires four times big number multiplications, but only three times encryption/decryption. Our scheme presents a better computation complexity for each complete authentication phase.
In term of energy consumption, the original BANZKP needs five transmission phases for a complete authentication. Even though our optimal scheme sends an additional field, R as a random pointer in exchange phase number 2), BAN-GZKP needs only three transmission phases instead of five. The energy needed to send the R value is hence negligible compared to two complete transmissions of BANZKP.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a new ZKP-based security scheme specifically designed for WBAN networks. Our scheme, BAN-GZKP uses two ingredients: a novel random key allocation which makes it resilient to the replay attack and redundancy information crack, and a hop-by-hop authentication scheme which makes it resilient to DDoS attacks at sink. Our BAN-GZKP improves, without any additional cost, the security level of the best ZKP scheme designed so far for WBAN networks, BANZKP. Moreover, when BAN-GZKP is used in order to secure existing convergecast protocols their performances are drastically improved compared to the case when BANZKP is used.
